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Abstract—Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) can be em-
ployed for device identification, authentication, secret key storage,
and other security tasks. However, PUFs are susceptible to
modeling attacks if a number of PUFs’ challenge-response pairs
(CRPs) are exposed to the adversary. Furthermore, many of
the embedded devices requiring authentication have stringent
resource constraints and thus require a lightweight authentication
mechanism. We propose PUF-RLA, a PUF-based lightweight,
highly reliable authentication scheme employing binary string
shuffling. The proposed scheme enhances the reliability of PUF
as well as alleviates the resource constraints by employing
error correction in the server instead of the device without
compromising the security. The proposed PUF-RLA is robust
against brute force, replay, and modeling attacks. In PUF-RLA,
we introduce an inexpensive yet secure stream authentication
scheme inside the device which authenticates the server before
the underlying PUF can be invoked. This prevents an adversary
from brute forcing the device’s PUF to acquire CRPs essentially
locking out the device from unauthorized model generation.
Additionally, we also introduce a lightweight CRP obfuscation
mechanism involving XOR and shuffle operations. Results and
security analysis verify that the PUF-RLA is secure against brute
force, replay, and modeling attacks, and provides ∼99% reliable
authentication. In addition, PUF-RLA provides a reduction of
63% and 74% for look-up tables (LUTs) and register count,
respectively, in FPGA compared to a recently proposed approach
while providing additional authentication advantages.
Index Terms—Lightweight authentication, PUFs, bit shuffling,
reliability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ever since the introduction of physically unclonable func-
tions (PUFs) [1] more than one and a half decade ago,
extensive research has been done in using these uncontrollable
manufacturing variations for enhancing the device security.
With the advent of advanced machine learning (ML)-based
modeling techniques [2], strong PUFs (SPUFs), previously
considered secure, now have their security in question. Given
a number of challenge-response pairs (CRPs) of a 64x64
Arbiter PUF [3], an adversary can build a soft model for
the device with a prediction accuracy of 99.9% [4]. These
model-building attacks can replicate the response behavior of
the actual hardware and make the system vulnerable to attacks.
Only eavesdropping the communication links back and forth,
between the prover and the verifier, an adversary can still
generate a highly accurate prediction model based on the past
CRP exposure.
Controlled PUFs (CPUFs) [5] are another class of SPUFs
which enhance the security and resistance against ML-based
modeling. These PUFs thwart model-building attacks by wrap-
ping the PUF inside a control logic. One approach is to build
the control logic in such a way as to limit the exposure of CRPs
for the adversary [6], [7]. Another approach is to obfuscate the
CRPs in such a way that even if the adversary can collect a
number of CRPs, no effective model can be built since the
original CRP relationship is only known to the device and the
verifier [4].
We propose a novel scalable authentication protocol which
not only obfuscates the CRPs but also greatly limits the
exposure of PUF responses thereby foiling any and all at-
tempts made towards unauthorized model generation. In the
previous works [4], [6], [7], [8], it was assumed that the
server’s database, containing the CRPs of the devices’ PUF,
is secure and an adversary has no capability to eavesdrop the
communication link between the server and its database. For
the previously proposed PUF-based security approaches [4],
[6], [7], [8], if the data (CRPs or models) associated with the
devices is compromised, then the security of the entire system
would be breached. Also, with an increase in the number of
devices to be authenticated by the server, storing the entire
CRPs for all the devices in secure server memory can be very
costly.
Another major factor which affects PUF based authentica-
tion is the reliability of PUF. A PUF, for a given challenge,
should ideally generate the same response under any envi-
ronmental condition. This type of ideality is not possible in
hardware as the response of a PUF to a particular challenge is
dependent on the physical characteristics of the device. Under
varying conditions (e.g., temperature, voltage) these physical
characteristics differ resulting in generation of responses with
bit flips associated with errors. Majority voting can help to
reduce the errors but it does not guarantee high reliability
under highly variable conditions. Contemporary approaches
[5] and more recently proposed [9] uses error correction
codes (ECC) in the device as a fix for the PUF’s reliability
problem. These approaches do not consider the high hardware
area overhead associated with computationally expensive error
correction schemes in a low cost device. Moreover, ECC
requires helper data to be communicated to the device by
the server during an authentication round. This exposure of
helper data provides another attack vector to the adversary
who can use this information for modeling as well as side-
channel analysis. We employ a different approach where the
error correction is not present in the device, rather, the server is
responsible for correcting the noisy responses of the device’s
PUF. By employing this, we not only guarantee a reliability
of ∼99% but also make the device extremely lightweight. Our
main contributions are as follows:
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• We employ a combination of binary string shuf-
fling/deshuffling and XOR operations to obfuscate the
CRPs associated with a device’s PUF. No challenge or
response in its original form is exposed on any commu-
nication link (i.e., between the device ⇐⇒ server and
server ⇐⇒ database). Furthermore, the challenge and
its issuance is strictly controlled by the device on-the-
fly within itself. Unlike some of the previous approaches
which use cryptographic hash functions with high hard-
ware overhead inside the device for response obfusca-
tion, our scheme provides an extremely lightweight, low
hardware cost dynamic obfuscation mechanism without
compromising the security.
• In PUF-RLA, the access to the underlying PUF in the
device is strictly controlled. No challenge is issued and
thus no response is generated unless a correct input
stream is applied to the device, essentially locking the
device from unauthorized access. This scheme is the first
that locks out the device without even invoking the PUF,
and thus completely inhibits any model-building as well
as side-channel analysis attack on the underlying PUF.
• PUF-RLA improves the PUF’s response accuracy and
therefore, the reliability, by employing error correction
scheme in the server instead of the device. The device
sends the noisy, obfuscated, shuffled responses to the
server which, after de-obfuscating and deshuffling, cor-
rects any underlying bit errors. This greatly reduces the
hardware overhead of the devices in the system without
compromising the reliability which makes this protocol
easily deployable in low cost devices.
II. RELATED WORK
Various schemes have been proposed in the past that imple-
ment a controlled strong PUF. Gassend et al.[5] have proposed
hashing of the input challenge and the response. However,
this configuration requires hardware-expensive hashing as well
as error correction logic in the device which makes it highly
infeasible for low cost platforms. Also, the server in [5] needs
to send the raw helper data to the device for stabilizing the
noisy PUF responses. This exposes the PUF to attacks focusing
on noise side-channel information [10].
Yu et al. [6] have proposed an approach that upper bounds
the available number of CRPs to an adversary. Only the trusted
entity or the server can authorize the access of new CRPs.
Furthermore, [6] has also introduced a nonce from the device-
side to prevent reliability-based attacks [10]. However, this
approach supports only a limited number of authentication
cycles (roughly 10,000) which makes it infeasible for IoT
based deployments. Gao et al. [7] have presented a finite
state machine (FSM) locking mechanism at the output of the
PUF circuit. A challenge is applied to the device and after
evaluation, the responses from the PUF are fed to an FSM
which traverses a given set of states till it reaches the final
state. If a wrong input/challenge is applied to the PUF by an
adversary, the response generated will prevent the FSM from
reaching the final state thus not producing a valid response.
The protocol presented in [7] seems to be sound but under
strict ideal conditions (which is not a realistic assumption)
where it is assumed that the device’s PUF response will have
a 0% variation. This is because [7] hashes the output of the
PUF response without error correction. Even a one bit error in
the generated response during authentication will result in a
wrong hash being computed and thus the protocol will fail
under noisy conditions. Also, the inclusion of hash in the
device drastically increases the hardware overhead.
Rostami et al. [8] have introduced Slender PUF, which
uses neither an error-correction logic nor any cryptographic
protocol but it provides an open interface to the adversary.
An adversary can acquire information about CRPs as long as
the device’s interface access is maintained. Chatterjee et al.
[9] have recently published a work which uses PUF based
authentication in an Internet of things (IoT) scenario and
replaces the traditional certificate-based authentication. It is the
first work in literature which considers the server’s database
to be breachable and secures it using keyed hash function.
The server in [9] only stores a single key in the non-volatile
memory (NVM). However, during the authentication phase,
the server sends raw challenges as well as the helper data
associated to the PUF to the device. This exposure of helper
data and challenges can result in side-channel attacks targeted
on the device’s PUF as the device’s interface is open to random
queries. Also, [9] uses Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem (BCH)
encoder/decoder based error correction logic inside the device
to correct the noisy response which results in a high hardware
area overhead. The protocols proposed in [11], [12] and [13]
also have a huge area overhead which makes them unsuitable
for low cost authentication purposes.
In the proposed protocol, we close the device’s interface
from brute force queries by employing a stream authentica-
tion (SA) mechanism. We also improve the PUF’s reliability
by incorporating BCH-based error correction in the server.
Unlike some previously proposed protocols, the presented
work doesn’t rely on cryptographic hashing for response
obfuscation, rather it employs a combination of shuffling and
XOR operations, which keeps the device lightweight and cost
effective.
III. PROPOSED SCHEME
Figure 1 shows the high-level diagram of PUF-RLA for
both the device- and the server-side. Both the channels, that
is, between the server and the device and between the server
and the database are insecure. Furthermore, the server also
contains error correction block for correcting the noisy PUF
responses. The server also incorporates a weak PUF which it
uses to generate the encryption key for encrypting/decrypting
the messages to and from the database. Instead of storing the
key itself, the server stores a challenge to the PUF inside
the NVM, which it uses to generate the Key. The device
contains a stream authentication (SA) block comprising of
a bit stream shuffler and a comparator.
Similar to other authentication schemes [4], [5], [6], [7],
[8], [9], this scheme has an enrollment phase and an authen-
tication phase. The enrollment phase takes place in a secure
environment during which the server assigns unique identifiers
Fig. 1. Proposed scheme (a) Server-side along with the database, (b) Device-side
(IDs) to all the devices in the system. The assigned IDs are
represented as idx where x ∈ Z+ denotes a device and Z+
denotes the set of positive integers (e.g., the ID of device 1
is denoted as id1). Device data (e.g., CRPs) is also collected
during the enrollment phase in the secure environment.
Algorithm 1 Enrollment Phase
Input: SEED: 128-bit initial seed value for PRNG1
Output: Database containing encrypted concatenated values
1: procedure ENROLLMENT
2: N0, N1, . . . , Ni, . . . , Nm−1, Nm ←
PRNG1(SEED)
3: for i← 0 to m do
4: if (i is even) then
5: Nis ← Shuffle(Ni)Counter2
6: E Nis ← Encryptkey(Nis)
7: Store E Nis in i/2th row and 1st column
8: else
9: < c >← PRNG2(Ni)
10: Rsi ← Shuffle(PUF (< c >))Counter2
11: Helpi ← HelperDataGen()
12: Si ← Shuffle(Ni)Counter1
13: Encryptkey(Counter2||Si||Rsi||Helpi)
14: Store encrypted data in Ceil(i/2)th row and 2nd
column
15: end if
16: Counter1 ← Counter1 + CONST1
17: Counter2 ← Counter2 + CONST2
18: end for
19: end procedure
A. Threat Model
We consider a threat model where the authentication phase
does not have to take place in a secure environment. The
adversary, in our threat model, can eavesdrop, manipulate, or
replay the traffic across all the communication links during
authentication events. These communication links include the
channel between the server and the devices as well as between
the server and the database storing the device’s data. By using
these communication links, the adversary can attempt to model
the device by utilizing the exchanged messages. The adversary
can also perform man-in-the-middle as well as spoofing attacks
in order to gain unauthorized access. The device also has an
open interface and the adversary can brute force query the
device with any past or possibly adaptively chosen current
messages/challenges.
B. Enrollment Phase
During the enrollment phase, a random number (RN) stream
is generated by the PRNG1 which uses a predetermined
constant seed value as shown in Figure 1(b). The total number
of CRPs will be equal to the half of the total number of RNs
generated. These random numbers are all 128 bits wide and
expressed as:
RNs = N0, N1, . . . , Ni, . . . , Nm−1, Nm, (1)
where Ni is the ith random number. In our case, we set
the maximum value of i, that is, m to be 9999 where m
must be odd (i.e., m ≡ 1 (mod 2)) and less than equal to
the period of the PRNG1. We clarify that all the RNs in
Eq. 1 are unique (i.e., belong to a non-repetitive sequence) as
m ≤ period of PRNG1. Every even-indexed RN is shuffled
using a shuffling key represented by Counter1 to get Nxs.
The shuffled even-indexed RNs are encrypted and stored in
the first column of the server’s database. Every odd-indexed
RN (Nx+1) is used as a challenge and passed as a seed for
the PRNG2 to derive the sub-challenges (< c >) for the
PUF in the device. The corresponding responses (Rx+1) are
shuffled using Counter2 to get shuffled responses (Rsx+1).
After the generation of Rsx+1, the challenge (or odd-indexed
RN (Nx+1)) is also shuffled using Counter1 to get Sx+1.
During the enrollment phase, helper data (Helpx+1), asso-
ciated with the device’s PUF responses, is also generated.
We then encrypt all the above generated variables to get
(enc(Counter2||Sx+1||Rsx+1||Helpx+1)) which is stored in
the second column of the server’s database. In this way, for
every value of encrypted Nxs in the database, we will have
a corresponding encrypted value containing the concatenation
of the shuffling key (Counter2), the shuffled version of the
challenge which is basically the odd-indexed RN (Sx+1),
the shuffled version of the response of the PUF (Rsx+1)
and helper data (Helpx+1) corresponding to the particular
response. This data is stored in the database as shown in
Figure 1(a).
Algorithm 1 shows the details of the enrollment in a more
simplified and succinct manner. It can be seen that for every
pair of even-odd indexed random numbers, the shuffling keys
(Counter1, Counter2) are different. This ensures that for
every iteration, a different shuffling sequence is generated.
It should also be noted that the shuffling key Counter1 is
not stored anywhere, rather it is used internally by the de-
vice during authentication. Therefore, the server itself cannot
get the original challenges since the server does not store
Counter1. The server can only get the shuffled challenges
from the database and send them to the device which uses
Counter1 to get the original challenge. This adds another
layer of security as the original challenge is only known to
the device itself.
After the completion of the enrollment phase, the device
will have a predetermined seed value (SEED in Algorithm
1), and Counter1 and Counter2 initialized to some initial
value. After every successful authentication event, Counter1
and Counter2 will increment by a fixed number defined by
CONST1 and CONST2 in Algorithm 1.
C. Authentication Phase
After successful enrollment of the device in the system,
the next phase is the authentication phase. The authentication
occurs in an insecure environment, where the communication
channels can be monitored by untrusted parties. For better
understanding of the protocol, we consider the first authen-
tication cycle after the device has been deployed. Figure 2
shows the series of operations during the first valid authen-
tication event between the server and the device. The server
initiates the authentication session by sending an initialization
message to the device. Upon sending the message, the server
generates a random nonce ns. The device upon getting the
initialization command generates a random nonce nd. The
device also initializes the PRNG1 with a predetermined
SEED and generates the first even-indexed RN N0. This
is the same as the first RN generated during the enrollment
phase in Algorithm 1. The device then uses the initial value of
Counter2 to shuffle N0 and generates N0s. The device then
sends the concatenation of it’s ID, the shuffled RN N0s and
the nonce nd to the server. The device then shuffles the nonce
nd using Counter2 to get nds. The server upon receiving the
message from the device verifies its ID and then performs a
Hamming Distance (HD) check on the received nd from the
device. HD is calculated between nd and an all zero string
of length L, where L is the bit-length of nd. Similar HD
calculation is performed between nd and all ones string .This
HD check is performed to ensure that nd has an acceptable
distribution between ones and zeros. Our tests show that a
30/70 ratio between zeros and ones and vice versa produces
highly random shuffles with 50/50 ratio being the ideal.
After successful HD verification, the server sends it’s own
nonce ns to the device which performs the same HD check on
ns. The device then generates the next RN N1 (odd-indexed)
using PRNG1. The device then shuffles ns using Counter2
Fig. 2. Operational cycle of first authentication event
to get nss. Parallel to the computations in the device the
server encrypts N0s using the encryption key and queries the
database’s first column to find the encrypted value. The server
retrieves the encrypted value (e(Counter2||S1||Rs1||Help1))
corresponding to the entry E N0s) from the database and
decrypts it to get the individual components. nds and nss
is generated in the server by shuffling ns and nd using the
decrypted Counter2 for this particular authentication. Note
that this Counter2 value in the server and the one in the device
is the same. The server then sends the XOR of the shuffled
versions of the challenge (odd-indexed RN), nd and ns to
the device. The device then retrieves the shuffled challenge
S1 by XOR-ing the received message with it’s own nds and
nss. S1 is then deshuffled using Counter2 in the device to
get N ′1. During a valid authentication event, that is, both
the device and the server are trusted entities and without
manipulation of the messages on the communication channel,
N ′1 and N1 (the odd-indexed RN generated in the device)
should be the same. The device then uses N ′1 as a challenge
to the PUF in the device to get a response (Rnoisy), which
depending on the environmental factors, can have bit errors.
The device then shuffles the XOR of the noisy response and
ns and sends this to the server. The device then increments
the two shuffling counters Counter1 and Counter2 by fixed
constant values defined during the enrollment. The server upon
receiving Rshuffle, performs deshuffling and XOR-ing to
retrieve the noisy response Rnoisy . The server then corrects the
noisy response by using the error correction scheme and the
helper data Help1 that was retrieved from the database. The
Fig. 3. (a) Shuffling of random input string, (b) Deshuffling to generate the original string
device is authenticated if the corrected response Rcorrected is
the same as the response acquired from the database.
After each authentication event, the device stores the most
recently used odd-indexed Nx for authentication (e.g., N1
after the first authentication event) in a temporary memory
so that in the next authentication event the device uses Nx+1
and Nx+2. For example, the device generates N2 and N3 as
the second even- and odd-indexed RNs, respectively, using
PRNG1, and repeats the same cycle for authentication as
depicted in Figure 2.
This protocol also supports unlimited authentications which
makes it an ideal candidate for IoT-based device authentica-
tions. After the authentication of the final pair of even-odd
indexed RNs, the control logic resets the PRNG1 to use the
SEED value again to start regenerating the same RNs. We
will show in security analysis how, even after re-using the
same RNs, the security of the protocol remains intact.
D. Input Stream Authentication
The Stream Authentication (SA) block is the primary se-
curity primitive that separates the underlying PUF from the
input. The SA block not only authenticates the stream issuing
server but also prevents the device from responding in case an
adversary tries to carry out a brute force or a replay attack.
The SA block uses a bit shuffling/deshuffling scheme followed
by a comparator.
Algorithm 2 Bit Shuffling
Input: n: L-bit random number in binary format
(nL−1, nL−2, ..., n0)
Output: s: L-bit shuffled version of the input
1: procedure BIT SHUFFLE
2: num1, num2, ..., numL ← PRNG(shufflekey)
3: for i← L to 1 do
4: j ← Range(numL−i+1, i)
5: Swap (nj−1, ni−1)
6: sL−1 ← nj−1
7: end for
8: end procedure
1) Bitstream Shuffler: The proposed protocol employs a
modified Fisher-Yates shuffling algorithm [14]. The algorithm
produces an unbiased permutation, where every permutation is
equally likely. Shuffling and deshuffling is performed in both
the device and the server according to Figure 2. Algorithm 2
shows the working of the shuffling operation for any random
number of bit length L.
Shuffling/Deshuffling Operation: To perform shuffling, a
PRNG takes a shuffling key as input, which in our case
is Counter1 or Counter2 in the device or Counter2 in the
server as shown in Figure 2, and generates a number sequence
[num1, num2, . . . , numL] (line 2 of Algorithm 2). Here, L
is the bit length of the input number to be shuffled. The
algorithm then iterates through all the numbers generated by
the PRNG and swaps the numL indexed bit with the loop
variable indexed bit (represented by i in Algorithm 2). Proper
range adjustment is also carried out to keep the indexing within
bounds. By using the same algorithm in a reverse manner, that
is, by using a shuffled number as input, the same shuffling key
to generate the number sequence and iterating in a reverse
manner, the original number can be recovered.
Illustrative Example of Shuffling and Deshuffling: Figure 3
shows the process of shuffling and deshuffling on a small
random test input by applying Algorithm 2. Note that this
is just a test case and the actual input is 128-bits wide. Also,
for simplicity, we group together the input bits into two bit
tuples and perform shuffling/deshuffling on the tuples instead
of the individual bits in this illustration example (note that
the shuffiling/deshuffling algorithm on actual 128-bits inputs
is performed bitwise and not on tuples in PUF-RLA). An input
bit string 100111001110 corresponding to random number
2510 is taken as an example. Assume that on providing a
shuffling key to the PRNG, the number sequence comes out
to be [1, 2, 3, 2, 1, 1]. These numbers are adjusted to be in a
decreasing range from R (1,6), with 1 being the minimum
number and 6 being the maximum, to R (1,1), with 1 being
the only number in the range. R (·,·) in Figure 3 represents the
range of possible output values of the Range(·,·) function (line
4) in Algorithm 2 for each corresponding iteration. For the first
run of Algorithm 2, the shuffling number is 1, so we swap
the 1st tuple of bits with the last tuple (Swap(S) (1,6)). In the
next run, we decrease the range by one (i.e., from R (1,6) to R
(1,5)). The shuffling number is 2, so we swap the 2nd and the
5th tuple (S (2,5)), and so on until we reach the last run (i.e.,
R (1,1)) where no swapping is done. The final shuffled output
comes out to be 001011110110 corresponding to decimal 758.
Note that for any other RN stream, the output will be different
then the one presented above. Deshuffling is performed using
the same number stream [1, 2, 3, 2, 1, 1] but in opposite manner
Fig. 4. Protocol-level attacks: (a) Man-in-the-middle attack, (b) Brute forcing
the device, (c) Replay attack
(i.e., from R (1,1) to R (1,6)) to regenerate the original input
as shown in Figure 3(b). Note that the case of R(1,1) is not
shown in Figure 3 (a) and (b) as no shuffling/deshuffling is
performed. In this way, if the server performs random shuffling
of an L bit message using a given key and sends the shuffled
message to the device, the device can get the original message
back by deshuffling using the same key.
It should be noted here that the security of the shuf-
fling/deshuffling scheme relies on the fact that the num-
ber/message to be shuffled has at least 30/70 ratio between
the number of ones and zeros. The RN sequence is carefully
chosen during the enrollment phase (Algorithm 1) by adjusting
the SEED value to ensure that the even- and odd-indexed
RNs have somewhat equal distribution of zeros and ones. The
shuffling keys (Counter1 and Counter2) are never sent over
the communication channel and thus the adversary has no way
of getting this information.
2) Comparator: The second sub-block in SA is a compara-
tor which checks whether the deshuffled input/challenge from
the server equals the challenge generated by the device. The
comparator also has control logic which, after determining the
result of comparison (TRUE or FALSE), enables or disables
the underlying PUF circuit. If the comparison turns out to be
TRUE, an enable signal is sent to the PRNG2 which uses
the deshuffled validated challenge to generate sub-challenges
(< c >) for the PUF. If the input to the device has been
manipulated, the comparator gives a FALSE output and the
PRNG2 remains in disabled state, and thus the PUF circuit is
not invoked and consequently does not generate any response.
Thus, by using a combination of the bit shuffler and the
comparator, the SA block verifies the legitimacy of the server
and prevents the device’s PUF against targeted attacks focusing
on brute force queries for the acquisition of responses for
unauthorized modeling.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze different attack scenarios by
which the adversary can attempt to break the protocol. Like
previously proposed schemes, we consider three main attacks
which include man-in-the-middle attack, brute force attack,
and replay attacks as shown in Figure 4. As described in
Section III-A, the adversary in our case can not only monitor
the communication channel between the server and the device
but also between the server and it’s database.
A. Man-in-the-middle Attack
Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack as shown in Figure 4(a)
is a protocol-level attack in which the adversary secretly
monitors the messages exchanged between the communicating
parties. The adversary can delay, alter, or eavesdrop the mes-
sages over an insecure network. The communicating parties
might think that their messages are being conveyed to the
legitimate and intended parties, however, the messages are
actually being manipulated by a third untrusted party. MITM
is generally prevented by employing mutual authentication
where both parties mutually authenticate each other during
message exchange. The protocols proposed in [7] and [9]
use hash function for mutual authentication however, the
computation of hash is an expensive and time consuming op-
eration. In PUF-RLA, we use shuffle and XOR operations for
mutual authentication. Assuming that the adversary modifies
(S⊕nds⊕nss) to (S′⊕n′ds⊕n′ss)MITM . The authentication
of the server by the device, in this scenerio, will fail as:
Sdevice 6= (S′⊕n′ds⊕n′ss)MITM⊕(Sdevice⊕nds⊕nss) (2)
Since the adversary has no clue about S, nds, and nss, the
only manipulation possible is the manipulation of combined
XOR of the three components. The approximate probability
of individually getting correct (nds⊕nss) from nd and ns by
brute forcing the shuffler is 12127 × 12127 ≈ 3.45×10−77 which
is extremely low. Since the authentication takes place in real-
time, the device will void the current authentication event if
the correct (S ⊕ nds ⊕ nss) is not received from the server
within some threshold time τms. The next authentication
event is then initiated with next even- and odd-indexed RNs
generated by PRNG1 after some predetermined wait-time.
After ω failed authentication events, the SA block locks out
the device, which can only be unlocked explicitly by the server.
This will prevent the adversary from trying out random input
combinations. Similar rationale can be given for Rshuffle
where the unknown noisy response Rnoisy is XOR-ed with ns
and then shuffled with a secret key. Only the server can extract
a valid Rnoisy from Rshuffle and disregard any manipulated
Rshuffle.
B. Brute Force Attack
Figure 4(b) shows the scenario where the adversary is
brute forcing the device’s interface to get the responses. The
main goal of the brute force attack on PUF is to acquire
data/CRPs of the PUF for modeling purposes. Since PUF-RLA
restricts PUF’s access at the input, the adversary cannot apply
random challenges and get responses. The SA block will halt
the operation, thereby not invoking the underlying PUF and
thus no response will be generated by the device. This non-
responsiveness of the device towards invalid inputs prevents
the adversary from generating a soft model of the underlying
PUF in the device. Also, the challenges issued by the server
are shuffled which further restricts the adversaries’ modeling
capabilities. For the brute force attack, the attack point again is
the manipulation of (S⊕nds⊕nss). Even though, both ns and
nd are known to the adversary, generation of (S⊕nds⊕nss)
for the SA block will prove to be a challenging and time
consuming task since the shuffling key (i.e., Counter2) is not
known to the adversary. Also, the shuffled challenge (S) can
only be decoded by the device to recover the correct challenge
for the PUF. Assuming uniform random distribution of 0’s and
1’s, the adversary will have to try out 2L combinations, where
L is the bit length of the input. The adversary will again be
locked out after ω failed authentication events.
C. Replay Attack
Replay attack is a type of MITM attack where the adversary
uses previously exchanged valid authentication messages to
masquerade as a legitimate entity. Generally, nonces or one-
time session identifiers are used to protect against replay
attacks. Figure 4(c) shows a scenario where the adversary
masquerades as a legitimate device and performs a replay
attack by using any previously sent messages over the commu-
nication links. Even if the adversary uses the previously sent
messages for a particular valid authentication event, the server
will still reject the authentication upon receiving Rshuffle
from the adversary. This is because Rshuffle is generated
by shuffling the XOR of the generated PUF response and
the current nonce ns of the server. Since the adversary does
not have the shuffling key Counter2, and is using Rshuffle
generated from some previous ns, the adversary cannot send
a legitimate Rshuffle for the current ns in the server. Thus,
the server will treat any previously valid message as invalid
for the current authentication cycle.
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS
We use Xilinx Zynq−7000 ZC706 evaluation board, as the
device, for the implementation of the proposed protocol. The
programmable logic (PL) part of the Zynq board implements
a finite state machine (FSM) which goes through all the
authentication stages of the device presented in Figure 2.
The FSM calls all the major routines including SA, the
PUF circuit, and the PRNGs. The processing system (PS)
part of the Zynq board is responsible for the communication
with a desktop/server running MATLAB R2018b via universal
asynchronous receiver-transmitter (UART). Since the device is
more resource constrained, we measure the hardware overhead
of the device side of PUF-RLA with the device side of
previous approaches.
A. PUF
The PUF used in this protocol is a variant of Arbiter PUF
(APUF) known as Double Arbiter PUF (DAPUF). Implemen-
tation of PUFs, particularly arbiter-based PUFs, is challenging
because of the strict symmetric routing constraints. Designers
can do their best to do symmetric routing in FPGA fabric
by imposing place and route constraints of various compo-
nents. However, even after imposing these routing constraints,
complete symmetry is still not achievable. Even a slight non-
symmetry can cause a delay bias in the arbiter output which
results in a loss of unpredictability of the PUF circuit. Au-
thors in [15] introduced the concept of implementing Arbiter
PUFs using programmable delay lines (PDLs). We use the
similar concept given in [15] to implement a PDL-based 3-1
DAPUF using 6-input look-up tables (LUTs) in the PL part
of Zynq-7000 SoC. PUFs are normally evaluated using three
performance metrics: uniqueness, reliability, and randomness.
TABLE I
3-1 DAPUF EVALUATION METRICS
Property Ideal 3-1 APUF 3-1 DAPUF
Uniqueness (%) 50 6.34 51.7
Reliability (%) 100 97.8 87.5
Randomness (%) 50 54.33 53.2
Table I shows a comparison of the various evaluation
metrics of a 3-1 DAPUF and a basic 3-1 XOR APUF. The
table is taken by averaging out the values generated after the
analysis performed by [16].
1) Uniqueness: Uniqueness tells the amount of variation
in PUF responses among different chips/instances. A 50%
uniqueness is ideal which means that the hamming distance
between responses of different PUF instances for the same
challenge(s) differs by 50% of total response bits. The unique-
ness U for PUF-RLA is defined as:
U = 2
nvr(r − 1)
r−1∑
p=1
r∑
q=p+1
v∑
i=0
HD
(
Rp2i+1 , Rq2i+1
)×100%,
(3)
where v = (m/2 − 1) and m is the last RN used in CRP
evaluations as indicated in Eq. (1), r and n are the total number
of PUF instances and challenge/response bits, respectively.
Rp2i+1 and Rq2i+1 denotes the PUF responses corresponding
to the odd-indexed RN (challenge) for PUF instances p and q,
respectively. As shown in Table I, the uniqueness of a basic
3-1 XOR APUF is very low which makes it unsuitable for
authentication protocols. In comparison, the 3-1 DAPUF has
a uniqueness much closer to the ideal value.
2) Reliability: For reliability testing, the PUF circuit is
evaluated under varying conditions (e.g., voltage and tempera-
ture) and HD is calculated between the ideal and the obtained
responses. Ideally, the same PUF instance should output the
same response given a particular challenge. However, this is
usually not the case and the generated responses have bit flips.
The reliability R of PUF in PUF-RLA is given by:
R = 100%− 1
vnl
v∑
i=0
l∑
t=1
HD
(
R2i+1, R
′
2i+1,t
)×100%, (4)
where v = (m/2 − 1) and m is the last RN used in CRP
evaluations as indicated in Eq. (1), n is the number of bits
in PUF response, t represents the total number of distinct
conditions (determined by temperature and voltage combina-
tion) for which the PUF response is evaluated for a given
challenge, R2i+1 denotes the PUF response corresponding
to the odd-indexed RN (challenge), and R′2i+1,t is the t
th
sample of R2i+1 obtained at a given condition (i.e., voltage
and temperature value). Thus, reliability measure subsumes the
average number of erroneous response bits for all the CRPs
evaluated at varying temperature and voltage conditions.
In case of 3-1 DAPUF, the reliability is, on average, 13%
less then the ideal value and can go further down by, as high as,
15% [16]. This is a very high error rate and can significantly
impact the authentication reliability. Without error correction,
the server and the device will have to restart the authentication
round which can significantly increase the execution time of
the protocol. Implementing error correction in the device, as
was the case for all previous approaches employing error
correction, significantly increases the area overhead. Further-
more, since error correction requires a particular b number
of syndrome/helper bits, to be communicated to the device,
an adversary can get b bits about the PUF delay circuit.
Since PUF-RLA provides the flexibility to implement error
correction at the server end, in addition to not exposing the
raw helper bits on any communication link, a good error
correction scheme can be implemented in software on the
server without increasing the device’s area overhead. As a
test case, we implement BCH encoder/decoder in software
using MATLAB R2018b using the bchenc/bchdec function.
The implemented BCH decoder has the capability to correct
up-to 20% error rate. This accounts to a practical reliability of
∼99% in addition to a ∼60% decrease in the area overhead
of the device.
3) Randomness: The final evaluation metric of a PUF is it’s
randomness. Randomness refers to the ratio of 0’s and 1’s in
the PUF responses. Ideally, a PUF response should comprise
of equal number of 0’s and 1’s. As shown in Table I, the 3-1
DAPUF has, on average, a randomness of 53% which is close
to the ideal value.
B. TRNG
The 128-bit nonce nd, generated by the device in PUF-RLA
is through a true random number generator (TRNG). We use
the approach presented in [17] for generation of nonces in the
PL of Zynq7000. The operation of this TRNG is governed by
enforcing a metastable state on the flip-flop through a closed
loop feedback control. Other than providing good randomness
properties, the hardware footprint of this TRNG is very low
making it an ideal candidate for generation of nonces in low
cost authentication schemes. Interested readers can refer to
[17] for the details regarding this TRNG.
C. Shuffler/Deshuffler
The shuffling/deshuffling operation requires a 128-bit dis-
tributed RAM and a 128-bit temporary register which stores
the intermediate results after every shuffle operation. A PRNG
is used to generate a number sequence which uses a shuffling
key as the seed value for the PRNG. The shuffler has a very
low hardware footprint (roughly 100 LUTs and 200 flip-flops
(FFs)) compared to cryptographic hashing schemes (>1000
LUTs and FFs [8]).
D. Comparison With Other PUF-Based Protocols
Tables II and III show the comparison of various properties
and hardware overhead, respectively, between PUF-RLA and
the past approaches. It can be seen that the PUF-RLA not
only retains the cumulative advantages of all the previous ap-
proaches while circumventing their limitations, it also reduces
the hardware overhead to a great extent without compromising
the security and reliability. The LUT count for PUF-RLA is
divided among all the modules as 384 (3-1 DAPUF + TRNG)
TABLE II
COMPARISON AGAINST PREVIOUS PROTOCOLS
Property [5] [8] [6] [7] [9] PUF-RLA
Scalable X X X X X X
TRNG 7 X 7 X 7 X
Mutual Authentication 7 7 X X X X
Crypto Algo in the Device X 7 7 X X 7
Error Correction in Device X 7 7 7 X 7
Helper Data Exposed X 7 7 7 X 7
Authentication Rounds ∞ ∞ d ∞ ∞ ∞
Open Server-Database Link 7 7 7 7 X X
Open Device Interface X X 7 7 X 7
TABLE III
HARDWARE OVERHEAD COMPARISON
Protocols LUT count FF count
[5] not reported not reported
[6] not reported not reported
[7] 960 1500
[8] 652 537
[9] 1591 1933
[11] 9207 2921
[12] 6034 1724
[13] 3543 1275
PUF-RLA 590 510
+ 10 (PRNGs) + 120 (Shuffler) + 76 (main control) = 590. The
FF count is divided as 20 (PUF + TRNG) + 128 (PRNG) +
204 (Shuffler) + 158 (main control) = 510. [8] has somewhat
similar LUT and FF count but it lacks the very important
feature of mutual authentication. In addition, PUF-RLA also
opens the link between between the server and the database
which [8] considers secure and circumvents the MITM as well
as other attacks possible on this link. [9] provides advantages
similar to PUF-RLA when it comes to authentication but PUF-
RLA has ∼63% and ∼74% reduction in LUT and FF count,
respectively. Also, PUF-RLA closes the open device interface
by enforcing the SA block on the PUF input which [9] does
not. [11], [12], [13] have a huge area overhead, as shown in
Table III, which makes them unsuitable for low cost platforms.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed PUF-RLA, a controlled
PUF-based, authentication protocol, which (i) closes the open
interface between the input and the PUF by implementing
a strong control logic that denies the PUF’s access to the
adversaries, (ii) makes the scheme highly reliable by incor-
porating error correction in the server thereby not revealing
any helper data on insecure channels, and (iii) reduces the
hardware overhead drastically by incorporating a lightweight
CRP obfuscation mechanism employing bit shuffling and
XOR operations. The security analysis of PUF-RLA verifies
that the PUF-RLA is secure against brute force, replay, and
modeling attacks. Results reveal that PUF-RLA provides 99%
reliable authentication. Additionally, PUF-RLA is lightweight
providing a reduction of 63% and 74% for look-up tables
(LUTs) and register count, respectively, in FPGA as compared
to a recently proposed approach while furnishing additional
authentication advantages. Our future goal is to extend PUF-
RLA to incorporate a secure key establishment protocol. This
would make PUF-RLA deployable in IoT based systems.
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